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Introduction
Transparency is one of the biggest innovations in central bank policy of the past quarter century. Modern central bankers believe that they should be as clear about their objectives and actions as possible. This notion arises from the view that policymakers should be a source of stability, not a source of noise; with the economy and markets responding to data, not to the policymakers themselves.
Inflation targeting is one of the first and most comprehensive implementations derived from this view. As a framework for monetary policy, inflation targeting involves 'the public announcement of medium-term numerical targets for inflation [and] increased transparency of the monetary policy strategy through communication with the public and the markets about plans, objectives, and decisions of the monetary authority' (Mishkin 2002, pg. 361 ). The result is not only clearly understood and published numerical targets, but also inflation reports that explain past and likely future actions. Most economists believe that greater transparency is beneficial. See, for example, the survey papers by Walsh (2007 ), Carpenter (2004 , Dincer and Eichengreen (2002) , and Geraats (2002) . However, transparency is not nudity. Understanding policymakers' contingency plans does not mean laying the policymaking process bare for all to see. Monetary policymakers should not put cameras in the meeting room. There are clear limits. What are they?
Recent theoretical work has put this question into a new perspective. In their pioneering work, Morris and Shin (2002 and 2005) show that when private agents have diverse sources of information, public information can cause them to overreact to the signals from the central bank, which makes the economy too sensitive to common forecast errors. The reason for this is that individuals care not only about accurately estimating the state of the economy, but also about having an estimate that is not too different from that of others. The implication is that more transparency may in fact be destabilising, so policymakers should think long and hard before changing their disclosure policies in ways that publicise more information. Svensson (2006) and Woodford (2005) both suggest that the Morris and Shin result is likely to be a theoretical curiosum rather than anything policymakers should worry about. That is, the circumstance under which additional information is welfare reducing is extremely unlikely to occur in the real world. As Svensson shows, Morris and Shin's own conclusion only holds when the noise in policymakers' publicly announced information is at least eight times that of the private information agents have obtained on their own. That is, public officials must be far worse in their evaluations of the economic environment than private agents. Evidence, such as that in Romer and Romer (2000) , suggests that central bank staff forecasts are at least as good, if not better than, those of market economists.
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Woodford's critique is based on the Morris and Shin choice of how to aggregate the quadratic loss functions of the individual agents. In their original paper, Morris and Shin assume that policymakers seek to minimise a social loss function that is based on the average squared error of individual estimates of the state of the economy. By contrast, if the social welfare function includes losses associated with the dispersion of agents' estimates of the statesomething Morris and Shin assume the agents themselves care about -then more information is unambiguously a good thing.
Regardless of these two coherent and largely convincing criticisms, the Morris and Shin argument retains intuitive appeal. In particular, policymakers worry that releasing more information might cause private agents to coordinate expectations, leaving the economy more exposed to common shocks. In the end, however, we are left with an empirical question: does increased transparency lead to lower dispersion in private forecasts? If the answer is no, then there is little to worry about. However, if the answer is yes, we cannot necessarily conclude that greater transparency-in the form of adopting an inflation targetis harmful. The reason is that greater transparency about the fundamentals and long-run inflation objective should also lead to a smaller dispersion of inflation forecasts which is beneficial. So, a smaller dispersion of private forecasts could reflect the beneficial effects of greater transparency and not the harmful effects described by Morris and Shin.
In this paper we study the degree to which increased information about monetary policy might lead to a reduction in the dispersion of inflation forecasts. By combining information about whether a country targets inflation with the dispersion of private sector forecasts of inflation, we seek to understand how inflation targeting affects private sector behaviour. In particular, does inflation targeting lead to a smaller or possibly larger dispersion of private sector inflation forecasts? If it leads to a larger dispersion, then there is no need to worry about the harmful effects of greater transparency discussed by Morris and Shin. However, if inflation targeting leads to a smaller dispersion, then there is at least some evidence that increased information could be harmful because it leads individuals to coordinate their forecasts à la Morris and Shin or could be beneficial because of additional information about central bank objectives and fundamentals.
In order to examine this, we estimate a series of simple models designed to measure the impact of inflation targeting on the dispersion of private sector forecasts of inflation. Using a panel data set that includes 15 countries over 20 years we find no convincing evidence that adopting an inflation targeting regime leads to a reduction in the dispersion of private sector forecasts of inflation. While for some specifications adoption of an inflation target does seem to reduce the standard deviation of inflation forecasts, in others it does not. And the precision of the estimates is rarely very high. The bulk of our evidence does not support the view that a 3 shift to inflation targeting has resulted in a significant decline in the cross-sectional standard deviation of inflation forecasts across survey respondents.
Before proceeding, it is useful to note that our work is distinct from, but related to, two earlier papers. First, Mankiw, Reis and Wolfers (2004) examine the dispersion of inflation expectations in survey data and find that inflation expectations have become more concentrated around the mean as the level of inflation has fallen. At first glance this may seem as if it is a result that is more positive than ours. But, given that Mankiw, Reis and Wolfers only study US data, it is not possible to disentangle the impact of disinflation from increased Federal Reserve transparency. Levin, Natalucci and Piger (2004) investigate how well the mean of inflation expectations has been anchored, also from survey data. They provide evidence on how inflation targeting has changed the dynamics of inflation. Their results suggest that the adoption of an explicit inflation target reduces the correlation of long-run inflation expectations with short-run movements in inflation, largely eliminating the link between expectations and realised inflation. Furthermore, Levin, Natalucci and Piger find that the adoption of an inflation targeting framework lowers the persistence of inflation, so that inflation behaves more like a random walk.
The remainder of this paper is organised in five sections. Section 2 provides a description of the data we use. This is followed in section 3 with a simple statistical analysis, and in section 4 with the results of more sophisticated regressions. Section 5 discusses some possible extensions and provides evidence on the robustness of the results. Section 6 provides a conclusion.
Description of the data
We study the dispersion of monthly survey-based inflation expectations for a number of countries from October 1989 to April 2009. The data are collected by Consensus Economics.
Each month the firm surveys a large cross-section of professional forecasters -currently more than 700 world-wide -asking each one for their current and next calendar years' predictions for growth, inflation, unemployment, and short-and long-term interest rates in the countries that they follow. This sample is sufficiently diverse to allow us to study the impact of inflation targeting, as two countries (New Zealand and Sweden) targeted inflation over the entire period, six (Australia, Canada, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, and the UK) adopted inflation targeting at some point during the sample, and the remaining eight have never adopted an explicit inflation target.
For the second group, the six that adopted an inflation target during the 1990s, we need to choose a date for the adoption. It is perhaps surprising that there is disagreement on this timing. Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007) , Ball and Sheridan (2005) , and Truman (2003) , among others, all choose slightly different dates. For the most part, we adopt the dating in Appendix A of Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007  , a closer look shows that the standard deviation is highest in January and falls throughout the year. This is not at all surprising, since as a particular year progresses, inflation during that year increasingly becomes an historical fact that need not be estimated.
To assess the seasonality in these series, we assume they are deterministic and estimate the following regressions:
where m kt D is a monthly dummy for month k. Notice that for this exercise, the coefficients (the k  's) are constrained to be equal across all of the countries in the sample.
The coefficients from equations (1) and (2), with a 95% confidence interval, are plotted in We also regressed the coefficients against {1, 2, …, 12, 0, …, 0} and {0, …, 0, 1, 2, …, 12}. The slope coefficients (t-statistics) were -0.003 (2.80) and -0.024 (23.1).
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(0.012 / 0.377). The implication of all of this is that it is important that further analysis account for the pronounced seasonality in the data.
Figure 3: Seasonal dummy coefficients
Source: Author's calculations based on equations (1) and (2).
Simple statistical tests
We now turn to the key question of this paper: is the spread (standard deviation) of inflation forecasts by survey participants lower in countries that adopt an explicit inflation target? To examine this, we start with some very simple statistics designed to measure whether the
are lower when a country's policymakers employ an inflation target. For clarity, we do this with a series of regressions. In the first one we estimate the following regression for each country separately: Table 2 . Note, there are only 6 countries that switched regimes during the sample period. For these countries, the average standard deviation for the non-inflation targeting regime is α, for the inflation targeting regime is α + γ, and γ is the difference. If the dispersion is smaller for inflation targeting regimes, we would expect to see γ < 0. These results allow us to conclude that for those countries that adopted inflation targeting during the period 1990 to 2009, the standard deviation of private sector forecasts for CPI inflation sometimes falls and sometimes rises. Specifically, the standard deviation of inflation forecasts falls when Australia, Canada, and United Kingdom adopt inflation targets; but it increases when Norway adopts an inflation target. Spain and Switzerland are somewhere in between, depending on whether you are looking at the dispersion of current year forecasts or next year forecasts.
A next step is to estimate the equations jointly using Zellner's seemingly unrelated regression approach. Since the model is estimated as a set of equations, we need the same number of observations for all countries. There are basically three different start dates that could be used: November 1990, January 1995, or June 1998. Depending on the start date, the number of countries that were both inflation targeters and non-inflation targeters differs, as seen in Table 3 . There is clearly a trade-off between sample size, number of countries, and mix of inflation regimes. 
Since the model is estimated as a set of equations, a Target variable can only be included for those countries that switched during the same period.
The results of estimating these equations using Zellner's seemingly unrelated regression approach are summarised in Table 5 . With three different start dates, the countries that were both inflation targeting and non-inflation targeting differ. We report results only for the countries that change regime, so the coefficient of interest on Target can be estimated. This exercise allows us to draw several conclusions. First, the coefficients on Target reported in Table 5 While these results are interesting, they fail to utilise information from the countries that either never adopted an inflation target or did so prior to the beginning of our sample. We 11 now turn to a more sophisticated analysis designed to account for seasonality, control for general macroeconomic volatility, and employ all of the data we have available.
Panel regressions
The various shortcomings mentioned at the end of the previous section can be addressed by estimating a set of equations using a panel regression approach. By estimating various regressions using both fixed effects and random effects (Baum (2006) ), we show that there is little evidence that inflation targeting countries have a smaller dispersion of private sector inflation forecasts.
Fixed Effects (FE)
We start by estimating some fixed effects models given the general applicability of this are reported in Table 6 and the time-varying constants (the constant and terms related to time) are shown in Figure 4 . 
where the constant  can be thought of as a mixture of the average level in January, the base month, plus the average impact of October 1989 to December 1990, while the u is the country-specific fixed effect. In addition, the table reports the long-run effect of inflation targeting on the dispersion: γ/(1-ρ).
In all cases, the coefficient on Target is negative, which suggests that countries with an inflation target have a smaller standard deviation of private sector inflation forecasts.
However, the coefficient is significant only for the bare-bones regression (excluding lagged 2 The chart plots the constant term (α) and coefficient on variables related to January of each year: Yeart (δt), Crisis1it (κ1), and Crisis2it (κ2). In this way, the chart plots the "time varying constant term.  . This suggests that the persistence of the spread is less for current year forecasts than for next year forecasts, but still sizeable. A larger coefficient on the lagged spread for next year forecasts than for current year forecasts might suggest that incoming monthly data plays a smaller role for next year forecasts than for current year forecasts. In addition, to the extent that lagged values of   . , y S capture overall macroeconomic uncertainty, the positive and significant coefficients suggest that the standard deviation of inflation forecasts depend on macroeconomic uncertainty. 
Random Effects (RE)
We next considered estimating the panel regression using a random effects estimator. The fixed effects (FE) model specifies the country specific effect as a constant, whereas the random effects (RE) model specifies the country specific effect as a random variable that is uncorrelated with the regressors. Breusch and Pagan (1980) ; the p-value is reported in Table 9 in the row labeled '
If the orthogonality assumption is true, then the random effects model is more efficient because it uses the assumption that u i is uncorrelated with the regressors. Of course, if this assumption is false, then the random effects model is inconsistent. We can then use a Hausman test of the extra orthogonality condition imposed by the random effects estimator.
The idea of the Hausman test is simple: if the regressors are uncorrelated with u i , the fixed effects estimator is consistent but inefficient and the random effects estimator is consistent and efficient; however, if the regressors are correlated with u i , the fixed effects estimator is 14 consistent but the random effects estimator is inconsistent. The results from using random effects to estimate the model are mixed. The coefficient on
Target is sometimes negative and insignificant and other times it is positive and significant.
Not surprisingly, one can always reject the hypothesis that Including a lagged dependent variable in a fixed effects model creates a large-sample bias in the estimate of the coefficient on lagged dependent variable. Since we are not really interested in this estimate, the concern is somewhat mitigated. In addition, in a simple model Nickell (1981) shows that for large values of T, the limit of
is approximately -(1+ρ)/(T-1). With ρ = 0.5 (0.8) and T = 235, the bias will be -0.0064 (-0.0077).
5
Robustness and Extensions
In this section, we check the robustness of the results by considering six modifications to the baseline model:
 we examine the sensitivity of the results to individual countries  we compute the standard errors of the estimated coefficients using alternative techniques  we consider the effect of the dating of the introduction of inflation targeting  we include various measures of actual inflation  we introduce commodity prices into the model  we replace the standard deviation of forecasts with their root mean square error.
In what follows, we discuss results only for the fixed effects panel regression using
and  .
,n S it  Thus, each of the six modifications to the baseline model is compared to the results in Table 6 . In general, the conclusions from the previous section are supported.
Sensitivity to individual countries
Since the panel includes 15 countries, the first robustness check is to see whether some countries are 'influential'. To check this, the fixed-effects panel regression is estimated with all countries, and then we exclude one country at a time. So, for example, we re-estimate the model with Australia excluded, we then include Australia but exclude Canada, we then include Australia and Canada, but exclude Norway, and continue in this way. Table 8 reports the coefficients and t-statistics on Target () for all three panel equations for all countries, corresponding to the columns as labelled in Table 6 , and then for each excluded country. In looking at the table, the appropriate comparison is between the first row ('None' excluded) and each subsequent row.
The results suggest that Canada and Norway may be influential for S(π, c) and that Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and Spain, may be influential for S(π, n). First, note that in all Note: Asymptotic t-ratios are in brackets. The coefficient and t-statistic on inflation target (  ) are reported.
Numbers in parentheses at the top of the columns refer to those in Table 6 . Note: Three sets of t-statistics, all in brackets, are provided for each coefficient estimate. The first is the asymptotic t-statistic computed using the conventionally computed standard error. The second is based on a standard error that is robust to heteroskedasticity. And the third is computed using a bootstrap. Coefficients on monthly and yearly dummy variables are not shown. Source: Authors' calculations based on equation (5).
Alternative measure of standard errors
Given the range of countries included in the panel of countries, the conventional standard errors reported in Table 6 may be misleading. Therefore, another robustness check involves estimating alternative standard errors. The standard errors reported in Table 6 are the typical standard errors for generalised least squares. As a check, Table 9 reports heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors and bootstrap standard errors.
Not surprisingly, the t-statistics are smaller. In particular, the t-statistic on the Inflation Target is now insignificant in all cases when using the robust or bootstrap standard errors. However, the other coefficients generally remain significant (the coefficient on lagged
insignificant no matter what standard errors are used).
Dating the introduction of inflation targeting
As noted earlier, the dating of the inflation-targeting regime is somewhat ad hoc and different researchers use different dates for the start of the regime. In addition, if survey participants take time to learn about the inflation targeting regime (for example, how serious are the authorities?), then an alternative dating regime could give different results. To test this 18 hypothesis, the fixed effects panel regressions are re-estimated using the third lag of Target rather than the current value of Target (from Table 1 ), thus allowing survey participants three months to learn about the new regime. The results are shown in Table 10 .
In this case, the coefficients on the lagged inflation target variable are somewhat larger (in absolute value) and significant for all three models for   c S it ,  , compared to only one of the models in Table 6 . And the coefficient is significant for two out of three models for   n S it ,  , compared to only one of the models in Table 6 . Thus, there is some evidence that it takes a couple of months for survey participants to respond to the introduction of an inflation targeting regime. Stated somewhat differently, it means the first three months of inflation targeting are influential observations in models 2, 3, and 5 because the coefficient on the inflation targeting variable is insignificant when these observations are included but the coefficient is significant when these observations are excluded. Note: Asymptotic t-ratios are in brackets. Coefficients on monthly and yearly dummy variables are not shown. Source: Authors' calculations based on equation (5) with Target lagged 3 months.
Including measures of actual inflation
Turning now to some extensions of the baseline model, we first introduce various measures of actual inflation into the specification. One measure of inflation is the percent change in the CPI from 12 months ago and the other measure is the year-average-over-year-average percent change. Since the survey participants provide estimates of the year-average-overyear-average inflation rate, the percent change from 12 months ago is not exactly comparable to the inflation rate being forecasted. However, it does provide actual inflation data that survey participants could use in forecasting inflation. The year-average-over-year-19 average inflation rate is comparable, but is the same for all months in the year. Including the lagged value of either inflation rate does not change the results in any meaningful way: the tstatistic on the inflation rate is always less than 1.0. (To conserve space, the results are not shown.)
Another inflation measure turned out to be significant. Since the dependent variable is the dispersion of private sector forecasts, one might expect that the variability of inflation would be a significant explanatory variable. The results in Table 6 suggest that the dispersion of private sector forecasts is a significant explanatory variable. We extend those results by including a measure of the variability of actual inflation, measured as the 12-month rolling standard deviation of month-over-year-ago inflation rates. This variable is significant in all six cases; the t-statistic is between 6.5 and 12.3 in equations for   
Commodity prices
Given the wide range of countries used in the panel, the effect of having an inflation target may be overwhelmed by other factors. In particular, some countries are more susceptible to commodity price shocks than other countries. In an effort to check this, we extend the results in Table 6 by including a measure of the volatility of commodity price inflation. Specifically, we include the lagged value of the rolling 12-month standard deviation of the percent change (from the previous month) in a commodity price index; the index used is the Commodity
Research Bureau spot raw industrial price index. The same commodity price index is used 20 for all countries under the assumption that commodity prices are set in world markets.
However, the coefficient on the commodity price variable is allowed to be different for each country. The results are shown in Table 
Root-mean-square error
Finally, we estimated a model similar to equation (3) Table 12 reports the results of this exercise. These are clearly more compelling than what we obtained using the dispersion of private sector forecasts against an inflation targeting variable. In particular, the coefficient on Inflation Target is negative and significant in 5 of the 6 equations.
While it may appear that the RMSE results are stronger than those using the dispersion, we view them with caution for two reasons. First, while the coefficient on the inflation target variable is larger when using RMSE than when using   ,.  it RMSE is calculated from relative actual inflation measured as year-average-overyear-average percent change and is thus the same for all months in a given year. Note: Asymptotic t-ratios are in brackets. Coefficients on monthly and yearly dummy variables are not shown. Source: Authors' calculations based on equation (7) with the RMSE as the left-hand-side variable.
Conclusions
Using survey data on inflation expectations drawn from Consensus Forecast, we find little evidence that inflation targeting countries have a smaller dispersion of private sector forecasts of inflation. While for some countries, some models, and some estimation techniques, we estimate that inflation targeting countries have a smaller dispersion of private sector inflation forecasts, for other countries, other models, and other estimation techniques, we find that they do not.
Returning to the question that motivated this analysis -'Does increased transparency lead to lower dispersion in private forecasts?' -the answer appears to be no. This suggests to us 24 
